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MARK C. WEBER*
Due Process hearing rights under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act are under attack. A major professional group and several
academic commentators charge that the hearings system advantages middle
class parents, that it is expensive, that it is futile, and that it is
unmanageable. Some critics would abandon individual rights to a hearing
and review in favor of bureaucratic enforcement or administrative
mechanisms that do not include the right to an individual hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker.
This Article defends the right to a due process hearing. It contends that
some criticisms of hearing rights are simply erroneous, and that others are
overstated. The system is generally fair to the various classes of parents,
even if some parents are better able than others to use it effectively. Costs
are remarkably low given the number of children receiving special
education, and hearings and hearing requests have been in decline for years.
Far from being futile, the due process hearing system is one in which parents
win a significant percentage of cases. And far from being out of control,
hearings are generally being managed effectively. The system could be
rendered still more efficient with a few modest reforms of the special
education statute and its interpretation.
Due Process hearing rights afforded by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act are under attack. A major professional group and several
academic commentators complain that the hearings system unfairly
advantages middle class parents, that it is unduly expensive, that it is futile,
and that it has gone out of control. 2 Critics would abandon the system in
favor of government enforcement or various forms of review of decisions
about special education decisions that do not include the right to an
individual hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.3 This Article defends the
right to a due process hearing. It contends that some criticisms of hearing
rights are flat-out wrong, and that others are badly overblown. The system is,
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1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006) (IDEA).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 38, 42, 46, 131-32.
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on the whole, fair to the various classes of parents, even if some parents are
better able than others to use it effectively.4 Costs are remarkably low given
the number of children enrolled in special education, and the numbers of
hearings and hearing requests have been in decline for years.5 Far from being
futile, the due process hearing system is one in which parents prevail in a
significant number of cases. 6 And far from being out of control, hearings are
being managed effectively; moreover the system could be rendered still more
efficient with a few modest reforms of the special education statute and its
interpretation.7
Special education matters to millions of children who otherwise would
not be effectively served by public education.8 Due process hearing rights are
needed to protect children's vital right to a meaningful education. This
Article outlines the case in favor of IDEA due process rights. Part I gives a
brief background on IDEA and the due process hearing rights the statute
affords parents of children with disabilities. Part II details the charges that
have been leveled against the existing due process system. Part III presents
the defense, arguing that the system is fair and not overly costly, that it
affords ample opportunities for success to parents, and that it operates well
within manageable bounds. Part IV explores the sometimes unrecognized
benefits of the due process system in protecting important educational
interests from arbitrary decisionmaking and in building up a body of special
education law precedent. Part V explores the drawbacks of some of the
alternatives that have been put forward to replace due process. Finally, Part
VI offers a few modest reforms that could make the due process hearing
system more efficient.
I. IDEA AND IDEA DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states that
receive federal special education funding to provide a free, appropriate public
education to all children with disabilities within their jurisdiction.9
Participating states and local school districts must provide appropriate
educational programs, and must also furnish services related to education,
4 See infra text accompanying notes 49-65.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 73-77.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 91-98.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 21-23 (describing state of education for
children with disabilities before Congress established rights parents could enforce).
9 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i) (2006) (authorizing appropriations).
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such as transportation, speech therapy, sign language interpretation, and
school nursing.10 The law requires that children with disabilities be educated,
to the maximum extent appropriate, with children who do not have
disabilities, and that school districts afford children with disabilities the
supplementary aids and services needed to prevent them from being removed
from regular classes.I'
Parents of children with disabilities have rights to notice and consent and
the right to participate in the creation of their child's individualized education
program (IEP). The IEP document sets out the services that the school
district commits itself to deliver to the child.12 It contains a statement of the
child's current levels of academic achievement and functional performance; a
list of measurable annual goals, both functional and academic; a description
of how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals will be
measured; an elaboration of the special education and related services and
supplementary services to be provided; an explanation of the child's
participation with nondisabled children in regular classes; a list of
accommodations needed by the child on state and district assessments; and
several other terms. 13
Parents may challenge the program or placement that the school district
offers by demanding an adversarial "due process hearing," and they or the
school district may appeal the result of the hearing to court. 14 At the due
process hearing, the parent and the school district have the right to be
accompanied and advised by an attorney, to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, and to compel the attendance of witnesses.15 They have
the right to a written transcript, and to a written document including the
10 Id. § 1401(26) (defining "related services").
11 Id. § 1412(a)(5).
12 See id. § 1414(d).
13 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
14 Id § 1415(f)-(i). School districts may also invoke the due process hearing
procedure, and are prone to do so if, for example, the parents refuse to consent to a child's
initial evaluation for special education eligibility. See § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I). States may
create a state-level hearing review procedure that must be exhausted before the matter
goes to court. § 1415(g). The child remains in the existing placement during the pendency
of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys' fees are available to parents if they are successful, §
1415(i)(3)(B}-(F), and to prevailing state educational agencies and school districts in
limited circumstances if the parents' hearing request is frivolous or for an improper
purpose, § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term
suspensions, expulsions, or other removals from school imposed on children with
disabilities. § 1415(k).
15 § 1415(h)(l}-(2).
497
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
findings of fact and decision.16 The hearing officer must not be an employee
of the state educational agency or the school district involved in the child's
education, must not have a professional or personal interest that conflicts
with the objectivity, and must have the knowledge and ability to understand
the law, conduct the hearing, and render and write the decision.17 In all but
rare circumstances, the parents have the right to keep the child in the current
educational placement pending the outcome of the hearing and appeals.18
The guarantee to each child with a disability of the right to a free,
appropriate education, and the guarantee to parents of procedural rights that
include a face-to-face hearing in front of a neutral decisionmaker were key
features of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act.19 The
participation and hearing rights manifested a "congressional emphasis" on
the individual ability of parents to enforce the law's underlying obligations.20
Two federal cases that influenced Congress in its drafting of the law had
upheld procedural due process claims against exclusion of children with
disabling conditions from public school as well as equal protection claims
over the denial of appropriate educational services. 21
Parents of children with disabilities spent years courting political allies to
secure passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, with its
guarantee of appropriate education and procedural protections. 22 Although
some states and local school districts served children with disabilities and
received limited federal special education reimbursement, before passage of
the 1975 Act approximately 1.75 million children with disabilities were
excluded from public school altogether and another 2.5 million were in
programs that did not meet their needs.23 In 1990, Congress renamed the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act the Individuals with Disabilities
16 § 1415(h)(3)-(4).
17 § 1415(f)(3)(A).
18 § 1415(j). But see § 1415(k)(4) (providing exception for certain school
disciplinary matters).
19 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(c),
89 Stat. 773, 775.
20 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982).
21 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972). The Supreme Court commented on the importance of these cases to the formation
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in Rowley. 458 U.S. at 192-94.
22 See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME, . . . AND EDUCATION FOR ALL: PUBLIC
POLICY AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 15-21 (2d ed. 1987).
23 H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).
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Education Act, and that is the name the law has today.24 The Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 embodies the most
recent set of amendments.25
The Supreme Court's one foray into interpreting the appropriate
education duty is Board of Education v. Rowley, a 1982 case in which the
Court held that appropriate education means services sufficient to provide
"some educational benefit" to a child with a disability.26 Services must be
beneficial 27 so that access to education is meaningful.28 But the Court said
that the congressional objective was "more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee
any particular level of education once inside."29 Schools had to provide a
"floor of opportunity" that would give "access to specialized instruction and
related services." 30
The Court at the same time stressed the importance of the procedural
rights, including hearing rights, that the special education law provides:
24 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
104 Stat. 1103. Over time, the term "handicapped" became disfavored, and many favored
placing the person first and the description of disability second, to emphasize that a
person with a disability is a human being rather than a manifestation of an impairment.
See Disability Rights: Manual of Style for Depicting People with Disabilities, ILL. ATT'Y
GEN., http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
25 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482
(2006)). See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REv. 7 (2006) (describing and
commenting on 2004 Reauthorization).
26 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
27 Id. at 200-01.
28 Id. at 192. The Court said there must be "personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Id. at
203.
29 Id. at 192.
30 Id. at 201. The Court applied this some-benefit definition of appropriate education
to reverse a holding that a first-grade student who was deaf but had lipreading skills and a
hearing aid was entitled to a sign language interpreter even though she achieved
satisfactory grades and passed from grade to grade without interpretation services. Id at
209-10. The Court said, "We do not attempt to establish a single test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act," id at
202, but indicated that if a child is advancing from grade to grade in regular education
classrooms the standard is likely to be met, id. at 203-04 & n.25. The Court rejected a
standard used by the lower courts in the case that a child must be provided services
sufficient to maximize her potential commensurate with the opportunity provided
children without disabilities to maximize their potentials. Id. at 198.
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When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards
embodied in § 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat
imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think
that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards
cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration to say that
Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with
procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of
participation at every stage of the administrative process, as it did
upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive
standard.31
Additional decisions from the Supreme Court interpreting the special
education law place further emphasis on procedural rights. In Honig v. Doe,
the Court noted that before passage of the 1975 Act, "Congress' earlier
efforts to ensure that disabled students received adequate public education
had failed in part because the measures it adopted were largely hortatory";32
the Court upheld the parents' enforceable right to keep a child with
disabilities who had been excluded from school for disciplinary violations to
remain in the current educational placement pending a due process hearing
challenging the child's removal.33 In a 2007 case, the Court ruled that parents
31 Id at 205-06 (citation omitted). The Court also noted that one of the two
constitutional right to education cases that most influenced Congress in drafting the Act
required the public school system to afford a hearing before an independent hearing
officer, to permit attorney representation at the hearing, and provide a right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 194 n.20 (citing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 879-81(D.D.C. 1972)). The other required the defendant to hold a hearing on
any change in a child's educational assignment. Id. (citing PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
32 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 n.1 (1988), superseded in part by statute, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4).
3 Id at 323-26. As it had in Rowley, the Court stressed the importance of
procedural rights, including the right to a due process hearing:
Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance and
indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of the IEP
and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness. Accordingly, the Act
establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee parents both an
opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's
education and the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate.
These safeguards include the right to examine all relevant records pertaining to
the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of their child; prior
written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes (or
refuses) to change the child's placement or program; an opportunity to present
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could enforce the law by going to court to challenge the outcome of the due
process hearing without an attorney, even though in other contexts they
would need a lawyer to proceed in court on their child's behalf.34 In affirming
this further ability to challenge the decisions of the public schools, the Court
stressed that IDEA gives parents independent, enforceable rights that are
both procedural and substantive,35 and that "[t]he statute's procedural and
reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy
of the education provided to a child . . "36
II. CHALLENGES TO IDEA DUE PROCESS HEARING RIGHTS
The due process hearing rights that Congress established nearly forty
years ago are now under attack. A recent report of the American Association
of School Administrators (AASA) argues that "modifications to the current
due process system could greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the burdensome
and often costly litigation that does not necessarily ensure measureable
educational gains for special education students."37 These "modifications"
consist of abolishing the due process hearing system, which the AASA
contends is unnecessary, hard for low- and middle-income parents to use, and
bothersome to public school staffs,38 frequently causing them to accede to
parental requests they consider unreasonable 39 and imposing stress on
personnel40 and legal expenses on school districts. 41
Criticism comes not merely from the targets of due process hearing
requests, who might be expected to complain, but from academic sources as
complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency's provision of a free
appropriate public education; and an opportunity for "an impartial due process
hearing" with respect to any such complaints.
Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).
34 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
35 Id. at 531 ("IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent
stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the
substantive decisions to be made.").
36 Id. at 531-32.
37 Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process AM. Ass'N SCH.
ADM'RS 2 (April 2013), http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy-and-Advocacy/
PublicPolicyResources/SpecialEducation/Julyl 3ReportFinal.pdf.
38 Id. at 3, 6-9.
39 Id. at 10-12.
4 0 Id. at 12-13.
41 Id. at 13-14.
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well. Professor Pasachoff criticizes the IDEA due process and appeals system
as a private enforcement mechanism, which, she says, in a non-means-tested
entitlement program, leads to enforcement disparities and resource allocation
distortions between rich and poor that public enforcement-monitoring and
the like-may avoid.42 That view is perhaps reinforced by stories in
Professor Colker's recent book about special education that portray poor
parents as unable to succeed in exercising due process rights, while
describing better-off families who prevail. 43 The AASA narrative also gains
support from seemingly offhand comments disparaging individual IDEA
litigation in one of the articles in a Journal ofLaw and Education symposium
on the thirtieth anniversary of the Rowley case.44 A student note in last year's
Journal of Law and Education also attacks the due process system as unfair
and calls for a replacement, though it does not say what that ought to be.45
Finally, Professor Rosenfeld has proposed voluntary binding arbitration as an
alternative to due process for parties who choose it, and recently published a
major article in support of the proposal.46 The House bill that became IDEA's
reauthorization in 2004 included binding arbitration, 47 though the measure
did not appear in the version of the bill that passed.48
42 Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2012) ("If beneficiaries with fewer
financial resources consistently bring fewer claims than their wealthier counterparts,
relying heavily on private enforcement may mean that the former group will not receive
their fair share of the distribution. Reliance on private enforcement will thus
unintentionally undercut the statute's substantive goals.").
43 See RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION 4-5, 153-60, 169-72, 184-87 (2013).
4 Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Is No Longer Good
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the
Rowley Definition of a Free, Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 22
(2012).
45 Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair) Well to Due Process: The Need for a
Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 501 (2013).
The note was the George Jay Joseph Education Law Writing Award winner.
46 S. James Rosenfeld, It's Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32
J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012). President Bush's Commission on
Excellence in Special Education made a proposal to allow for binding arbitration in 2002.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW ERA:
REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 35 (2002).
47 H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. § 205 (2003).
48 See generally Weber, supra note 25, at 32 (contending that Congress was wise in
rejecting arbitration proposal).
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III. CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES
Diverse objections are raised by the AASA, by the academic
commentators, and, undoubtedly, by others. The system is said to reward
parents who have more resources and to distort allocations of public
educational services. The system is challenged as being too costly. Affording
hearing rights is futile because, supposedly, parents rarely win. Even some
authorities who generally support due process hearing rights think that due
process, as practiced, has gotten out of control. Each of these contentions
deserves an answer.
A. Does the system unfairly advantage parents with
resources?
The proper response here is confession and avoidance. Yes, the system
works better for those with the financial power and temerity to use it
effectively. That will tend to be parents who are middle class and above or
who have educational or professional expertise. But this should hardly be a
surprise. The "haves" come out ahead in the legal system generally, and
Professor Galanter's classic discussion of the mechanisms by which they do
suggests that the result is all but inevitable.49 In an economic system that
permits inequality of resources, those who are better off will be able to afford
better access to advocacy services just as they can afford better shelter, better
nutrition, better clothing, better medical care, and better everything else. But
that does not mean that the opportunities for advocacy should be taken away,
leaving no one with the ability to use the law to assert their rights. Leveling
parents of disabled children down simply levels the educational bureaucracy
up.
One must admit that Professor Pasachoffs position is more nuanced than
that discussion might make it out to be. She takes the view that disparities are
morally worse in distribution of services under a statute like IDEA that does
not purport to give more to the wealthy, than disparities are in other
situations. 50 But it is hard to view inequalities as more of a problem with
49 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
50 Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1442 (discussing "moral" consequences of
enforcement disparities). But see id. at 1434-35 ("I consider not an abstract, moral
question about the appropriate components of the social contract for children with
disabilities, but a narrower question about the distribution of public moneys in the context
of a statute that does not purport to give more to the wealthy.") (footnote omitted).
503
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
regard to advocacy over public education services than with they are with
criminal justice, 51 which should be equally available to rich and poor, or
minimizing one's taxes, a task for which the rich have far more resources to
spend strategically on lawyers and accountants, than the poor do. 52 The
disparities on educational advocacy are, one would think, much less
troubling than disparities on who serves in the military.53 It is true, as
Professor Pasachoff says, that rich families are better prepared to deal with
retaliation for exercising their hearing rights by exiting the public school
system, 54 but that is hardly a reason to eliminate procedural rights for
everyone. Middle class employees are in a superior position to withstand
retaliation if they complain about discrimination too, but that does not mean
Congress should eliminate the right to file administrative complaints and
individual lawsuits over discrimination.55 Moreover, since courts will award
51 Notably, Supreme Court cases mandating access to criminal defense for those
who are poor do not guarantee equality of advocacy. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (guaranteeing right to counsel in criminal cases involving imprisonment);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring provision of free trial transcript or
alternative means of supporting appeal for indigent defendant).
52 Although the Supreme Court has at times said that due process entails the right to
be represented by counsel in a judicial or administrative proceeding, it has not said that
the attorney must be provided for free for people who cannot afford representation if the
case is a civil one. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (holding that due
process rights, including right to pre-termination hearing, apply to general assistance
cutoff; stating, "We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination
hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so
desires.").
53 See ironically U.S. Continues Proud Tradition of Diversity on Front Lines, THE
ONION (Mar. 26, 2003), http://www.theonion.com/articles/us-continues-proud-tradition-
of-diversity-on-front,3170/ ("With blacks and Hispanics comprising more than 60% of
the Army's ground forces in Iraq, the U.S. military is continuing its long, proud tradition
of multiculturalism on the front lines of war.").
54 Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1444.
55 The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the availability of administrative and
judicial remedies for retaliation against those who complain about employment
discrimination. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)
(upholding retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for complaining about
discrimination against co-worker); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167
(2005) (upholding claim for retaliation under Title IX of Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-82 and applicable regulations). See generally Michael J.
Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court? The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV.
917 (2009) (discussing recent retaliation case law).
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attorneys' fees to parents who prevail at IDEA due process hearings, one
major equalizer, an attorney, will often be available to rich and poor.56
As will be developed at greater length below, another effective leveler is
the ripple effect of successful due process proceedings on all, even when
brought by better-resourced parents. Even Professor Pasachoff
acknowledges:
Poor children with disabilities have undoubtedly gained from the
self-interested advocacy of families with more financial resources on
the whole-whether in litigation broadly defining rights under the
IDEA, amendments to the statute setting expansive terms, or
generous appropriations decisions-even if in the particulars of
individual cases the positive externalities are minor.57
In direct response to Professor Pasachoff and a similar argument from
the AASA 58 that the wealthy parents' successful hearings draw to their
children resources that should be spread among all, it is hardly clear that
there is a fixed pot of educational goods and if the better advocated-for
children succeed, the poorer advocated-for will necessarily have less. Due
process is not a zero-sum game, for several reasons. More expensive services
are not always what the parent asks for-witness the number of cases where
the parent wants services in a less restrictive environment and the school
resists, even though the less restrictive placement may be less costly.59 When
that is not the case, due process decisions upholding private placements may
lead districts to create in-house public school programs that serve a larger
56 Obviously, one could exaggerate the importance of fees awards, given that they
come at the end of the case, and only when the parents succeed, and there are the well-
known problems of mootness and the offer of judgment rule standing in the way. See
Mark C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357 (2004) (discussing difficulties with obtaining attorneys'
fees in special education cases under current law). Nevertheless, many lawyers in private
practice demand little or no retainer from the client when taking IDEA cases.
57 Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1459.
58 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 7-8.
59 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying placement
in general education setting for child with Rett Syndrome); see also Weber, supra note
25, at 44-45 (contending that school officials who oppose less restrictive programs are
frequently captives of standardized operating procedure).
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group of children, at a lower per-child cost. 60 Moreover, additional resources
are typically available outside the school district's immediate budget, for
example, in state risk pools for funding education of children with high
needs, 61 if the state establishes the pool and the district applies for
assistance. 62 Even apart from risk pools, and depending on a given state's
special education funding mechanism, state money to a district may increase
when the district provides more intense services to one or more students. 63
Moreover, it is not obvious that all school administrators are eager to play
Robin-Hood-in-Reverse in the way a critic might suggest. 64 Educators have
professional integrity and take their obligations to serve all children
60 This phenomenon has happened with regard to highly specialized services for
young children with autism. See Autism Instructional Supports & Services, OFFICE OF
DIVERSE LEARNER SUPPORTS & SERVICES, CHI. PUB. SCHS., http://www.cpsdivers
eleamer.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=1633&Itemid=643 (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (describing extensive support services for students with autism,
with first consideration to supplemental aids provided in public school general education
classrooms); see also Alyssa Katz, The Autism Clause, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 30, 2006, at 52,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/23172/index3.html (describing likely
success in obtaining autism services by filing due process hearing requests against New
York City and consequent development of new public school programs for children with
autism).
61 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(e)(3)(A)(i) (2006) ("For the purpose of assisting local
educational agencies . .. in addressing the needs of high need children with disabilities,
each State shall have the option to reserve for each fiscal year 10 percent of the amount
of funds the State reserves for State-level activities under paragraph (2)(A) -
(I) to establish and make disbursements from the high cost fund to local educational
agencies in accordance with this paragraph during the first and succeeding fiscal years of
the high cost fund . . . .").
62 EVE MOLLER, RISK POOLS: STATE APPROACHES, NAT'L Ass'N ST. DIRECTORS. OF
SPECIAL EDUC., (April 2006), available at http://nasdse.org/DesktopModules/DNNspot-
Store/ProductFiles/178_dea70b21-4c4b-4bb9-8433-4c92266754a2.pdf (reporting that 30
of 42 state respondents said their states had risk pools before 2004 IDEA
Reauthorization, and that 25 of 30 planned to continue the existing risk pools, with
remaining 5 planning to adopt risk pool arrangement found in new law, and 5 of 12
without risk pools planning to use procedure under new law).
63 See THOMAS PARRISH ET AL., STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS,
1999-2000 3-11 (2003) (describing state special education financing systems generally,
including those that employ weighting systems for assumed extra costs of educating
children in various disability categories and those that allocate funding based on teacher
and related service personnel counts).
64 See Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1441-42 ("When facing choices among possible
programs for a wealthy child and a poor child, districts have an incentive to acquiesce to
the more expensive requests of the former and to provide the less expensive option to the
latter, since the risk of a private enforcement action is greater with wealthier families.").
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seriously,65 though the due process hearing system is still needed to deal with
lapses and disagreements.
Many thoughtful writers who argue that people without means are at a
disadvantage in the due process system do not want to get rid of hearing
rights. Instead, they would expand remedies and supports to make it easier
for poor parents to use the system. One article by a trio of experts lists
specifics such as creating emergency and interim hearing procedures,
strengthening notice, reinstating the right to expert witness fees, shifting the
burden of proof to school districts, reinstating the catalyst theory for
attorneys' fees, and increasing the number of publicly funded lawyers.66
Professor Colker does not propose reducing due process rights; on the
contrary, she supports provision of a free educational advocate for parents as
soon as there is reason to think their children may need special education.67
Professor Chopp, who appears to agree with some of the criticism concerning
advocacy disparities, calls for increased public enforcement of IDEA in
addition to increased access to free and low-cost attorney services so parents
may make use of existing due process hearing and litigation rights.68 Even
Professor Pasachoff has a "disinclination to eliminate private enforcement of
the IDEA."69 Of serious concern, however, is that legislators or others
reading the critiques of due process will ignore caveats of that type. For
example, the AASA paper cites Professor Pasachoff several times; 70 it also
65 See Anne P. Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of the Academic
Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REv. 393, 446 (1998) ("In reaching the placement decision
teachers, special education specialists, school psychologists, and others make
professional judgments, based on their evaluation of the child in question, as to what
degree of integration is appropriate. This judgment is necessarily complex, contextual,
and nuanced.").
66 Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails
Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special
Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 107, 156-59 (2011).
67 COLKER, supra note 43, at 245; see also Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't
Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1822-23 (2008)
(calling for free educational advocate services).
68 Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: Collaborative in
Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 458-59 (2012).
69 Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1461 (stating in addition, "Few suggestions, I think,
would more swiftly eviscerate the possibility of real reform that would benefit poor
children with disabilities than to argue that private enforcement should be cut. Moreover,
eliminating private enforcement of the IDEA would likely reduce the benefits offered to
wealthier children under the statute, thereby promoting equality by leveling down.").
70 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 8 nn.16, 20, 11 n.33.
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cites Professor Rosenfeld several times, though he would retain due process
hearing remedies while adding an arbitration option. 71
B. Is the hearing system too costly for school districts?
The AASA links the cost of hearings, particularly the risk of having to
pay parents' attorneys' fees and the lost time for school personnel, to what it
declares is the over-willingness of school districts to accede to unjustified
demands from parents for services for their children.72 Impartial study of the
costs tells a different tale. One extensive multi-state study of hearings is a
Government Accountability Office investigation from 2003. Its title reflects
its principal observation: Special Education: Numbers of Formal Disputes
Are Generally Low and States Are Using Mediation and Other Strategies to
Resolve Conflicts.73 It reported a five-year decline in hearings held (even
though hearing requests increased during that period), and concluded,
"Overall, dispute resolution activity was generally low relative to the number
of students with disabilities. About 5 due process hearings were held per
10,000 students with disabilities."74 If districts are settling disputes on the
basis of anything other than predictions of actual outcomes at hearings, it
would seem that they are drastically miscalculating the likelihood that a
hearing will in fact occur, much less that the parents will prevail and the
district will be liable for fees.75 Since the time of the GAO report, IDEA has
been amended to discourage parental hearing requests by, among other
things, making parents and their attorneys subject to liability for the district's
attorneys' fees if the request is found to be frivolous.76 Not surprisingly, the
71 Id. at 15-16. Professor Rosenfeld has unequivocally dissociated himself from the
AASA's recommendations. See S. James Rosenfeld, Director's Statement on AASA
Report on Due Process, SEATTLE U. SCH. L. IDEA ALJ/HO ACAD.,
http://www.law.seattleu.edulcontinuing-legal-education/idea-aljho-academy (last visited
Mar. 21, 2014).
72 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 11.
73 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-897, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF
FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY Low AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND
OTHER STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS (2003).
74 Id. at "Highlights" page.
75 Regarding rates of parental success, see infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
76 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III) (2006). The statute also now contains
much more elaborate pleading requirements than before, further discouraging not fully
considered requests by parents. See id. § 1415(b)(7)(A).
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latest data show a 10% decline in hearing requests over the past seven years,
and a 58% decline in hearings held."
Moreover, if the districts are concerned about hearing expenses and their
side effects on policy, they may-and do-buy insurance. As the AASA
notes, "Many districts have insurance plans through their state association or
collective of state associations that may cover some of their legal fees after
the due process hearing once they reach their deductible."78
C. Parents never win, anyway?
The urban legend is that parents very rarely win due process hearings,
and so taking away hearing rights would not matter. The premise of the
argument is simply false. Parents do win, and the rate of winning goes up
dramatically when they have attorney representation. 79 An Illinois study
covering a five-year period showed a success rate of 16.8% for parents
without attorneys and 50.4% for those with attorneys.80 Given that both
clients and lawyers are likely to present multiple claims, some stronger or
weaker than others, success on one major issue should be considered success
on the case as a whole. The Illinois study defined it that way.8' A study of
hearings (both with attorney representation and without) in Iowa showed a
parental success rate of 32% and mixed results in an additional 8% of
77 Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Trends in Dispute
Resolution under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) DIRECTION
SERVICE (Dec. 2013), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdflTrendsDRIDEA
DEC2013.pdf.
Even the AASA admits that "longitudinal data collected by the Department of
Education demonstrate the decline in the use of due process hearings." Pudelski, supra
note 37, at 11.
78 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 14; see also Chopp, supra note 68, at 455-56
(discussing prevalence of school districts' insurance for special education hearings and
stating that it permits districts to take more aggressive negotiation postures).
79 There is no good way to tell whether the attorney effect is because the attorneys
take only the best cases, or they present them better, or some combination of the two. See
generally D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?,
121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2188-95 (2012) (complaining that studies of effectiveness of
attorney representation do not or cannot account for selection effects).
8 0 MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: ATTORNEY
REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS 1997-2002 7 (2002), available at
http://dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf.
81 Id. at 3 ("As defined here, a parental 'win' means that the parent substantially
prevailed on at least one, but not necessarily all, of the major issues in a case.").
509
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cases. 82 Another study of 575 hearings in fourty-one states in 2005-2006
gave the parental win rate of 30.4% and mixed results in another 10.4%.83
The student note criticizing due process procedures that was referred to
above described a study of hearings in Wisconsin and Minnesota from 2000
to 2011 that showed that parents who were represented by attorneys had a
13% win rate and a "split decision" rate of 23%.84
Of equal importance, beneficial deterrent effects occur with regard to
how school districts serve other children, even though the parents do not
always succeed, or succeed in a majority of cases. Consider an analogy: The
National Center for State Courts reports that the win rate at trial for medical
malpractice plaintiffs is only 23%,85 yet the prospect of malpractice liability
increases the care with which medical providers behave. 86 One may be
reluctant to make comparisons to the criminal justice system, but it is worth
noting that the win rate for criminal defendants is extremely small.87
Nevertheless, few Americans would advocate giving up the right to a
criminal trial. It seems obvious that the prospect of a criminal case going to
trial before a neutral judge and jury makes the police and prosecutors more
careful in making sure that the person charged is indeed guilty. Tellingly, the
82 Perry Zirkel et al., Creeping Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An
Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 37 (2007).
83 Tracy Gershwin Mueller & Francisco Carranza, An Examination of Special
Education Due Process Hearings, 22 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUDS. 131, 137 (2011).
84 Cope-Kasten, supra note 45, at 528. Reported win rates for parents tend to be
artificially low because many hearings are ones invoked by school districts to obtain
permission to evaluate. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(ii)(I) (2006) (permitting school
districts to use due process hearing procedures when parent refuses to consent to child's
initial evaluation for special education or fails to respond to request for consent). It
should be no surprise that districts win almost all of those cases.
85 Cynthia G. Lee & Robert C. LaFountain, Caseload Highlights, NAT'L CTR. FOR
ST. CTs. 4, (Apr. 2011), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/
Highlights/18 1 Medical MalpracticeIn_StateCourts.ashx (interpreting nationwide
data from 2005).
86 Of course, some argue that this effect is excessive in medical malpractice, but
deterrence occurs, whether it is at an optimal level or not. For a concise discussion of the
"defensive medicine" issue, see Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2007) (reviewing TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
MYTH (2005)).
87 United States Attorneys reported a conviction rate of 93% for FY 2010 (81,934
defendants convicted out of 91,047 defendants). EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2010
STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading room/
reports/asr2010/10statrpt.pdf.
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AASA relies on the existence of deterrent effects when it complains that
school districts give in and provide services to avoid threatened due process
proceedings.88 The AASA says that districts frequently accede to requests
from parents that they would not agree to but for the existence of due
process. 89 This argument entails the conclusion that the existence of the
hearing right has a powerful effect.
Nonetheless, the AASA contends that:
[T]here is no evidence demonstrating that successful challenges to an
IEP in a due process hearing lead to marked improvements in the
academic performance of students with disabilities or improvements
to what the district was providing students originally. No research
proves that students who take advantage of IDEA's due process
provisions fare better academically after undertaking the hearing
process. 90
Given the overall small numbers of children involved in hearings and
absence of any clear control group, it is difficult to imagine what kind of
research the AASA is demanding. The AASA could be contending that
enhanced or different services than those offered by the district caused no
benefit to the child, though a researcher would be hard put to design a
controlled experiment that would be consistent with ethical practices that
would test that hypothesis. Or it could be contending that compensatory
services or tuition reimbursement are no good for the individuals who receive
them, but that seems counterintuitive at best and in some instances
preposterous.
D. Are hearing rights out of control?
There are those who believe that the due process system as originally
conceived was a good thing, but that hearings have become too frequent, too
long, and too complicated.91 This position too is dubious. As noted, in recent
years the number of hearings has declined significantly. 92 As a rule, hearings
88 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 11-12.
89 Id at 3.
9 0 Id. at 7.
91 See Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 55 MoNT. L. REv. 403, 404-05 (1994) (stating that due
process has become too time-consuming, overly adversarial and unduly formal).
92 See supra text accompanying note 77.
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are also short: one state study determined that 47% of hearings took one day
or less, and 23% were decided with no hearing at all. 93
That system can hardly be described as one that is out of control, but if
the description were accurate, there are means to fix it short of eliminating
important due process protections. One factor relative to the complexity of
due process hearings that is readily subject to legal reform is the judicial
exhaustion rule. In special education cases, courts apply administrative
exhaustion requirements with vehemence. 94 Knowledgeable practitioners
realize that if they fail to completely develop an issue at due process, they
will not be able to rely on it if the case goes to court. Moreover, even if an
issue has properly been raised at hearing, it is extremely difficult to persuade
judges to hear new evidence on the issue when the case is on appeal to the
district court. 95 Obviously, some hearings become protracted due to poor
presentation on one side or both. But some, notably a locally famous 13-day
hearing in Illinois,96 become protracted because highly skilled lawyers know
the hearing is their only chance to build a record for appeal, and they want
the record to be comprehensive. 97 Unfortunately, matters seem to have
become worse, not better, for the prospects of relaxation of exhaustion
requirements. As an illustration, in a 2013 Eleventh Circuit case, the court
insisted that every single claim presented by a set of facts be raised and
exhausted before it could properly be brought to court.98
93 Ill. State Bd. of Educ., infra note 97, at 2.
94 See, e.g., Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 725
(10th Cir. 1996) (requiring administrative exhaustion despite argument exhaustion would
have been futile); MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE
§ 21.8 (3d ed. 2008 & supp. 2012) (collecting cases enforcing administrative exhaustion
rule).
95 See, e.g., Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984),
affd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (requiring admission of evidence only in limited
circumstances). This fact remains true despite the statutory language that the court "shall
hear additional evidence at the request of a party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i) (2006).
96 Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 221, No. 002535, Ill. State
Bd. of Educ. (Aug. 29, 2002), available at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/
ISBE2535.PDF.
97 A study by the Illinois State Board of Education listed as reasons for increasing
costs and increasing number of hearing days as (in order): the complexity of the cases;
the increased use of expert witnesses; "The need to prepare a thorough and convincing
record in the event of a court appeal;" and four other factors. ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC.,
STUDY OF THE ILLINOIS DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES 3 (Mar. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/spec-ed/pdfs/dpstudy.pdf.
98 A.L. ex rel. P.L.B. v. Jackson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 543 F. App'x 1002 (11th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished).
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Some supposed reforms to IDEA have also increased complexity of
hearings, and these too should be undone if Congress wishes to undertake
real reform. The pleading requirements put in place in 2004 increase
paperwork and promote delay. 99 Settlement procedures under existing law,
including IDEA's offer of settlement rule, are ambiguous and have
unintended negative consequences. 00 In contrast, a few helpful steps have
recently been taken to simplify hearings, such as the trend in the states away
from two tier (hearing and decision and then review officer proceeding)
systems to one-tier processes.' 0' Better case management by means of
prehearing conferences and orders has led to more focused and quicker
hearings, as has the increasing professionalization of the corps of
administrative law judges and independent hearing officers.102 Congress has
not required that hearing officers "be lawyers." 0 3 Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that hearing officers' expertise in conducting hearings efficiently has
increased over the years, and it was wise for Congress to require in 2004 that
hearing officers possess the knowledge and ability to understand the law, to
conduct hearings, and to render and write decisions.104
99 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (2006) (creating extensive requirements for due
process complaints and restricting amendment); Zirkel et al., supra note 82, at 48 ("[T]he
Congressional prescription in the latest amendments to the IDEA, particularly the
strengthened notice-pleading feature and extended timeline for the hearing decision,
clearly borrow from, and potentially add to, the judicialization trend. Time will tell
whether the new pre-hearing procedures reduce the frequency and complexity of cases
that go to hearing, but the likely trade-off will be not only more technical threshold
issues, such as whether the complaint was sufficiently specific, but also closer and more
complex cases, thus meaning longer duration to decision.").
100 See Mark C. Weber, Settling Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Cases:
Making Up Is Hard To Do, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 641, 662-65 (2010) (discussing aspects
of procedure related to settlement of IDEA cases that need improvement).
101 See RICHARD ZELLER ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND
ACTIVITIES (2006), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/APR%20Indicator/ 20
Summary/o2OBl 6%20-%20Bl9%20-%202006-07.pdf ("More states seem to be moving
toward single tier hearings systems managed by State Offices of Administrative Hearings
(OAH). Potential benefits include: better trained and skilled Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs) as hearing officers who have focused experience and daily support for
conducting/managing hearings.") (also listing potential disadvantages).
102 Significant in this regard are the activities of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary, http://www.naalj.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
103 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2006) (setting out necessary
qualifications for hearing officers).
104 Id. Before the amendment, a district court declared that "there is no federal right
to a competent or knowledgeable ALJ." Camwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 577, 583
(D. Md. 2000).
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IV. UNDERAPPRECIATED BENEFITS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
One obvious argument in favor of the existing system is the perhaps
tautological, but critically important, point that due process hearings afford
due process. Due process is constitutionally required, and for good reason.
Due process of law protects against arbitrary governmental decisions, those
that are made without allowing the persons affected to participate or without
following a consistent legal principle.105 The interest at stake in IDEA cases
is that of families in the education of their children, as vital an interest as
there is. The Supreme Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education,
"[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. . .. In these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education."1 06 If by Rowley's definition, what
children with disabilities are entitled to is access to education that is
beneficial to them, the deprivation of that access needs to be protected by
adequate procedures. What those procedures should be has been articulated
in a line of due process cases stretching from before Goldberg v. Kelly,107
which includes Goss v. Lopez,'08 and the right to education actions such as
Mills and PARC. Those cases demonstrate that adversary procedures are
needed-and widely provided-in any number of situations where citizens
are dissatisfied with determinations that government actors make concerning
essential entitlements for individuals and families.109 The adversary
procedures include a neutral decisionmaker"io rendering a decision with a
statement of reasons, as well as the opportunity to compel attendance of
witnesses and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. 111
105 See Jane Rutherford, The Myth ofDue Process, 72 B.U. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1992).
106 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
107 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
108 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
109 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §
7.4 (2011) (collecting cases in which hearing rights have found to be required by due
process).
110 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that
due process requires recusal of judge who received significant campaign contributions
from litigant); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (requiring disinterested
adjudicator in case involving imposition of minor fine).
Ill See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) (detailing hearing
rights for revocation of parole); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) ("In almost
every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."); see also id. at 270-71
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Cases such as Mills and PARC presaged the procedural due process test
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, a test that considers the importance of the
individual interest affected; the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest
and the probable value of additional safeguards; and any countervailing
governmental interests.1 12 Applied to the entitlement to appropriate special
education services, the test requires hearing rights. Access to education is of
critical importance; adversary hearing procedures protect against a very real
risk of deprivation; and, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, existing hearing
procedures represent a wise congressional determination that any
countervailing concerns do not prevail. In other words, due process hearing
rights are both crucial and constitutionally required. The label "due process
hearing" is so familiar that one forgets it embraces a correct conclusion of
law.
The development of a body of precedent at the administrative level is
another important benefit of having due process hearing rights. 113 Precedents
are established either locally or more broadly when due process cases are
adjudicated and appealed. It may be correct, as Professor Pasachoff says, that
many cases are unique and so lack general applicability, 1 4 but many other
cases fall into patterns-behavior intervention, least restrictive environment,
specialized services for children with autism, transportation, private
placement, and so on. Within each of these fields, administrative rulings and
decisions on judicial review provide the body of law that practitioners and
adjudicators need for guidance in future cases.1 15
(requiring opportunity to be heard by counsel and statement of reasons by decisionmaker
in welfare termination hearing).
112 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Critics have charged that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of procedural due process does not account for all of the
concerns embodied in the constitutional clause. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 28 (1976). This Article
does not attempt to propose alternatives to current procedural due process doctrine.
113 This side-benefit of litigation in establishing precedent has often been noted. See,
e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REv.
327, 376 (2013) ("[L]itigation also generates positive externalities by enhancing
compliance with efficient laws and producing precedents to guide future conduct.").
114 See Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1440.
115 For an argument that the federal special education law would benefit from more
case-by-case adjudication ultimately leading to a more coherent body of law on the topic
of appropriate education, see Mark C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of
Appropriate Education: The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J. L. & EDUC. 95 (2012).
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The need to establish precedent through hearings and judicial review
brings up an additional important benefit of existing due process hearing
procedures: they produce comprehensive records for review in the courts.
Imagine a federal judge trying to sort through notes or a transcript of a
freewheeling, informal discussion of a child's needs and proposed services,
and trying to decide whether to allocate trial time to an evidentiary hearing to
go over everything again.116
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE ALTERNATIVES
The "trust us" approach of AASA is not a good one. It is not realistic to
rely on school districts to consistently behave in accordance with the law
when they face budgetary and other pressures." 7 Even if some districts do
not face those pressures, or if greater costs are not an issue in a given case,
anyone who has ever worked in a school, or had significant dealings with
one, knows schools are vulnerable to the twin threats of standard operating
procedure and entrenched interests. 18
The alternatives of facilitated IEPs and special education consultancy
proposed by AASA are no substitute for existing hearing rights. Nothing in
federal law forbids IEP facilitation, so it is freely available to states. About
half of states have IEP facilitation nOWll9 so whatever gains it provides are
being realized already or are not perceived as worthwhile enough to support
its adoption. As the AASA concedes, IEP facilitation leaves the power over
program and placement with the school district.120 Moreover, even if
facilitation is currently successful, there is no reason to believe that it will
116 This point may of course be taken too far, as with the current caselaw on
exhaustion and limits on admissibility of new evidence on review. See supra text
accompanying notes 94-98.
117 See Mark C. Weber, All Areas of Suspected Disability, 59 LoY. L. REV. 289,
319-21 (2013) (collecting and discussing sources on budgetary pressures on school
districts under current economic conditions). This point does not contradict the point
made supra text accompanying note 65 that school personnel frequently resist budgetary
squeezes and do the right thing. Due process is designed for outlier cases, not normal
ones.
118 For a statement of the contention that American special education has fallen
victim to such influences, see Frederick M. Hess & Frederick J. Brigham, How Federal
Special Education Law Affects Schooling in Virginia, in RETHINKING SPECIAL
EDUCATION 161-62 (Chester E. Finn et al. eds. 2001).
119 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 17.
120 Id. at 18.
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continue to be so without due process hearing rights to equalize the
bargaining power of the parent and the district.
The "independent, neutral special education consultant" proposed by the
AASA is also an unsatisfactory substitute for due process. As the AASA
says, under its plan lawyers and advocates cannot serve, 121 which creates a
school-side power imbalance from the outset. If the parties try to go to court
after the consultant acts, there will be no usable record for review, no
maintenance of placement, and no one will ever have developed the facts
through cross-examination. The consultant merely has the ability to
recommend obtaining additional evaluations of the child,122 and remedies are
limited to revised IEPs, not reimbursement of expenses or compensatory
education, which, under the plan, only a court (or a voluntary agreement by
the school district) could provide.123 True, "this system is considerably less
stressful for special education teachers, specialized instructional support staff
and administrators,"' 24 but that is because it would be less effective as a
means of enforcing the law. If there has been any success with similar ideas
in the past, there is no reason to expect it to work once the option of due
process is off the table.
Arbitration would eliminate critical protections of the law, most notably
control over the nature of the proceedings and scope of the evidence, and
depending on the arbitration system adopted, cost-free access, judicial
review, and the availability of attorneys' fees.125 Due process protections
help to moderate the huge power disparity between school districts and
parents. Legal remedies are always an equalizer, and are essential to
maintaining a just public order.126
Mediation as an adjunct to due process has been successful, but it needs the
threat of due process to make it work. It is no surprise that diplomatic solutions
121 Id. at 20.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 4.
124 Id. at 22.
125 See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA,
Getting Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 16 (2004) ("Binding arbitration is not really an appealing endeavor, and
may well lead to a lose-lose situation between home and school.").
126 See Deborah M Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the
Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 737, 745 (2002) ("The established prescriptive norm
includes the resolution of disputes and remedying of injustices within a legal system that
operates according to just, consistent rules and procedures, and upon which the core
principles of democracy are said to depend. The instruments and processes of law are
understood to serve as the structures upon which democracy functions.") (footnotes omitted).
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may depend on the backstop of coercion. The AASA proposal would actually
diminish the effectiveness of mediation by barring attorneys,127 thus again
exacerbating the power inequality that parents face. The AASA report also says,
cryptically, that under its proposal "the mediation agreement is not legally
binding," 28 which gives the school district the unilateral ability to revoke
whatever agreement it made. Careful observers of mandatory alternative dispute
resolution processes note that, like formal adjudication processes, these
procedures tend to reflect power imbalances in favor of repeat players.1 29
Monitoring or other public enforcement, as favored by Professor
Pasachoff, has its merits, but parents lack any control over it, and the funding
cutoff threat is so unrealistic that it does not have much of a deterrent effect.
As Professor Pasachoff says, "[E]ven though the federal agency charged with
IDEA enforcement repeatedly found states in violation of the IDEA, it has
almost never taken any formal action to withdraw funds, limiting its
involvement to negotiation and acceptance of minimal improvements." 30
Professor Pasachoffs suggestions for strengthening public enforcementl3'
may help, although it is difficult to say how.politically realistic they are in an
anti-regulatory, anti-central government era. The AASA asserts that the
current monitoring system conducted by the U.S. Department of Education,
combined with enforcement of the No Child Left Behind law, is so effective
as to eliminate the need for due process,132 but that position is hard to square
with reality 33 Curiously, although the AASA seems to think that existing
monitoring is an adequate substitute for due process, it concedes that "there
is no correlation between the number of due process complaints filed by
parents and the number of findings by state or federal departments of
127 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 19.
128 Id. See generally Jim Gerl, Superintendents Want to Eliminate Due Process
Hearings and Mediation, SPECIAL EDUC. L. BLOG, http://specialeducationlawblog.
blogspot.com/2013/04/superintendents-want-to-eliminate-due.html (stating that AASA
proposal "would completely gut mediation").
129 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 39-50
(1999).
130 Pasachoff, supra note 42, at 1463 (collecting sources).
131 Id. at 1465-85.
132 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 2, 6-7.
133 See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, School Achievement Reports Often Exclude the
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A10 (describing exclusion of children with
disabilities from assessments and manipulation of cohorts to avoid reporting
achievement).
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education of noncompliance." 34 That is hardly surprising, for monitoring
focuses on record-keeping and various technical compliance indicators more
than substantive compliance with appropriate education obligations.
The AASA says that enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and
Title IX of the Education Amendments relies on executive branch activity
rather than individualized remedies and entitlements,135 but that is incorrect. 136
What is correct is that the Supreme Court eliminated private judicial
enforcement of Title VI disparate impact obligations in Alexander v.
Sandoval.137 Few informed observers think of that as a positive development
for racial justice.138
VI. SOME USEFUL REFORMS
The reforms that might aid enforcement of IDEA without incurring
negative side effects are modest procedural changes, only a few of which
would demand new legislation.139
134 Pudelski, supra note 37, at 10.
135 Id. at 5-6.
136 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (upholding Title IX
private right of action); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978)
(lead op.) (upholding Title VI claim).
137 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-86 (2001) (rejecting interpretation of
Title VI adopted in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), which upheld Title VI disparate
impact claim).
138 See, e.g., Adele P. Kimmel et al., The Sandoval Decision and Its Implications for
Future Civil Rights Enforcement, FLA. B.J., 24, 26 ("[T]he Court's ruling in Sandoval does
not prevent federal agencies from bringing their own enforcement actions, which may
include cutting off federal grants to programs that employ policies or practices that have an
unjustified disparate impact on minorities. As a practical matter, however, this fact offers
little solace to victims of discrimination because federal resources for enforcing Title VI and
its regulations are limited. [FN15] Indeed, during the Clinton administration, the United
States filed a brief in Sandoval stating that 'private enforcement provides a necessary
supplement to government enforcement' of Title VI and its implementing regulations.")
(footnotes omitted); Derek Black, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces After Alexander v.
Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REv.
356, 357 (2002) ("Sandoval has closed a door that was once essential to ensuring the
enforcement of civil rights legislation and providing equal opportunity to people of all races
and ethnicities."); Melanie K. Gross, Note, Invisible Shackles: Alexander v. Sandoval and
the Compromise to the Medical Civil Rights Movement, 47 How. L.J. 943, 947 (2004)
(describing Sandoval as "severe blow" to medical civil rights).
139 A catalog of reforms that are somewhat more ambitious than those discussed
here is found in Hyman et al., supra note 66, at 155-61.
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A. Providing expert witness fees.
Providing expert witness fees as a matter of course for prevailing parents
would equalize the position of the parties in due process disputes.140
Moreover, it would not necessarily increase number of hearings. In cases
where the experts on both sides agree-a situation that happens more than
might be expected-settlements typically ensue. When that does not occur, a
more convincing expert presentation by one side or the other may well
induce the other side to give in. This reform would require legislation to
overrule the Supreme Court ruling that IDEA did not permit expert fees, but
that prospect is hardly unrealistic. Congress passed a similar amendment
restoring expert fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Act and Title
VII.141
140 See Leslie Reed, Comment Is A Free Appropriate Public Education Really
Free? How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with
Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 251, 299 (2008) ("While some parents will not be
dissuaded from pursuing an IDEA lawsuit by the inability to recover expert fees, many
parents of children with [autism spectrum disorder] will not have such an opportunity
because they will not have the financial backing to fund an expert."); see also Allan G.
Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court Rejects Parental Reimbursement for
Expert Witness Fees Under the IDEA: Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy, 213 WEST's EDUC. L. REP. 333, 348 (2006) ("Arlington clearly
appears to shift the balance of power to school boards by denying reimbursements to
parents for the costs of expert witnesses, thereby possibly limiting parental access to such
important help in protecting the educational rights of their children with disabilities.").
141 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned West Virginia University Hospitals v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1988's provision of attorneys'
fees to prevailing parties in civil rights cases did not include expert witness fees. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat, 1071, 1079. Responding to
widespread criticism of Casey, see, e.g., Eileen R. Kaufman, Choosing the Insidious
Path: West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and the Importance ofExperts in
Civil Rights Litigation, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 57 (1991), Congress provided
for expert witness fees for prevailing parties in cases under the Reconstruction Era Civil
Rights Acts, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006), and Title VII, see id § 2000e-5(k). But
because Casey explicitly distinguished the fees provision in IDEA from § 1988 and noted
the congressional intention to have expert witness fees included in IDEA fees awards,
Casey, 499 U.S. at 91 n.5, Congress had no reason to change IDEA. Then the Court
decided Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291
(2006), applying Casey's interpretation of unamended § 1988 to IDEA and eliminating
expert fees in IDEA cases. A congressional effort to overturn Casey failed several years
ago. See S. 613, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (both
unenacted).
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B. Relaxing exhaustion and new-evidence rules.
The proposal would actually not be to relax the rules, but to restore what
appears to have been Congress's intent regarding exhaustion. Senator Paul
Simon, a sponsor the 1986 Handicapped Children's Protection Act, the law
that codified IDEA's exhaustion requirement and applied to selected claims
under other provisions, described a broad set of situations in which IDEA
does not require exhaustion:
It is important to note that there are certain situations in which it is
not appropriate to require the exhaustion of EHA administrative
remedies before filing a civil law suit. These include complaints that:
First, an agency has failed to provide services specified in the child's
individualized educational program (IEP); second, an agency has
abridged or denied a handicapped child's procedural rights-for
example, failure to implement required procedures concerning least
restrictive environment or convening of meetings; three, an agency
had adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability
that is contrary to the law, or where it would otherwise be futile to
use the due process procedures-for example, where the hearing
officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought; and four, an
emergency situation exists-for example, failure to provide services
during the pendency of proceedings, or a complaint concerning
summer school placement which would not likely be resolved in
time for the student to take advantage of the program.142
As noted above, courts are in fact applying a more draconian regime.143
Courts should also be more faithful to IDEA's text regarding new evidence
on appeal. 144
142 131 CONG. REC. 21392-93 (1985); see also id. at 31, 376-77 (1985) (statement
of Rep. George Miller).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 94-98 (discussing exhaustion).
144 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) ("In any action brought under this
paragraph, the court- . . . shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party.")
(emphasis added). But see, e.g., West Platte R-1 1 Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 785
(8th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court refusal to permit supplementation of
administrative record).
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C. Continuing to streamline due process proceedings.
This reform could be achieved by discouraging elaborate motion
practice, holding prehearing conferences to clarify the dispute, and seizing
every opportunity to minimize procedure while still affording ample
opportunity to be heard. 145 Continued movement by states to one-tier hearing
systems should also reduce the ponderousness of the system and eliminate
unnecessary second-guessing.
D. Continuing efforts to enhance professionalism and
training of independent hearing officers and administrative law
judges.
Hearing decisions receive significant deference when reviewed by
courts. 146 To justify the deference, the decisionmakers need to have expertise
and professionalism. Hearing officers and administrative law judges should
receive education not only on legal issues, but also on the substance of
special education and educational assessment: what works when, what is
trending, and how to evaluate expert opinions.147
E. Strengthening enforcement ofsettlements when
enforcement is appropriate.
This step is important so that parties do not refuse to settle for fear that
the settlement will not be obeyed. Unfortunately, the consequences that
ensue when a party reneges on a settlement are anything but predictable.148
145 See sources cited supra note 99 (discussing steps added to IDEA hearing process
in 2004).
146 See, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189 (2d Cir. 2012)
("[T]he role of the federal courts in reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA
is circumscribed. We must give due weight to the state proceedings, mindful that we lack
the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve questions of educational
policy. It is not for the federal court to choose between the views of conflicting experts
on such questions.") (citations and internal quotations and alterations omitted).
147 See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 551 ("Many hearing officers are faced with the
obligation to decide between proposals that they are not well trained to evaluate.
Moreover, because of fears of being perceived as partial, many believe themselves
handcuffed in asking for or requiring additional information from either of the parties that
they suspect may be important, if not crucial, in deciding the case before them.").
148 See Weber, supra note 100, at 654-66.
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Some relatively simple steps, such as ensuring federal jurisdiction for suits to
enforce private settlements of due process hearings, and clarifying that no
exhaustion is required for those cases, would increase the certainty that
settlements will stick and strengthen the incentives to settle. 149
CONCLUSION
To borrow one of Professor Colker's favorite words,o50 the appropriate
conclusion for this paper is, "[D]on't dis due process." The system of due
process hearing rights for parents under IDEA is indeed under attack, but due
process rights are worth defending. Due process hearings afford protections
to parents and children that will be missed sorely if they are lost. Moreover,
with some modest improvements, the due process hearing system could be
even more effective at guaranteeing that children receive the education owed
them under law.
149 Id. at 663-64.
150 Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States? Invalidation of State Action
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REv. 1301 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001).
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